Backscatter X-Ray Machines
Various agencies have heralded the use of backscatter X-ray machines [wikipedia] as a safe, non-invasive technique for scanning airline passengers to detect weapons or devices hidden under clothing or in sensitive areas of the body.
Independent of the security value of these machines, I was curious about how they operated, who developed them, and who sells them.
Steve Smith appears to be a scientist involved in creating similar technology (the “SECURE 1000“); the company Rapiscan seems to sell a variety of these kinds of devices. The SECURE 1000 looks different than backscatter machines I’ve seen at airports. It looks like Dr. Smith has been fairly successful; his research group’s Web site (http://www.spectrumsdi.com/) redirects to SAIC.
The ISU site claims that the risks from radiation of these machines is negligible.
This concept is a pretty hot topic:
“Airport admits ‘strip search’ body scanners WILL show people naked”
“X-ray Body Scanners Arriving at Airports”
Slate, with the salacious title: “Digital Penetration”
The dailymail article above quotes an official saying: “The images are not saved, you literally walk through, the screener hits a button to say clear and the image goes.” The Slate article quotes the TSA: “‘Images will not be printed, stored or transmitted,’ TSA swears on its Web site.” [the link Slate provides is broken, but here is the TSA main page for "Advanced Imaging Technology" and the "Privacy" subtopic. -Ed.]
This claim is what troubles me most. It troubles me because it sounds like officials repeating a marketing line they’ve been handed by companies selling these sorts of systems, with little real proof or assurance for the public that these machines have been certified not to store the images.
Given the requirement to have the personnel looking at the scan be physically removed from the subject being scanned means that these images are captured and transmitted to some computer terminal. This in turn means that the image or file traverses a network and most likely winds up on a commodity PC screen. There is likely some file and temporary storage involved here — making sure that this data is completely wiped from the system and not inadvertently saved (even on hard disk temporary or memory swap space) is a non-trivial programming exercise. And there is a tangible energy cost to proactively deleting information.
The TSA privacy Web page for this technology says: “Advanced imaging technology cannot store, print, transmit or save the image, and the image is automatically deleted from the system after it is cleared by the remotely located security officer. Officers evaluating images are not permitted to take cameras, cell phones or photo-enabled devices into the resolution room.”
While this is an admirable sentiment, as a citizen, I’d like to see proof of these limitations rather than a statement of policy. In fact, given that running wires and cabling is an expensive process (and leads to messy trip hazards), I suspect the transmission of these images is wireless. It would be interesting to observe the wireless frequencies in use at airport checkpoints (something that can be done very surreptitiously, unless laptops are banned completely) and capture the data passing over them.
Also of interest, TSA’s Freedom of Information site: http://www.tsa.gov/research/reading/index.shtm. Among the documents here are PDF scans of citizen feedback on backscatter technology [PDF], ranging from a few well-argued positions to short, barely legible emotional reactions to various TSA practices. Also present are contracts that TSA has with various private companies. Good to see which beltway bandits are hooked up to the TSA teat. Finally, there are also videos of Salt Lake City’s checkpoints.
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